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ABSTRACT 
New York’s School Tax Relief Program, STAR, provides state-funded property tax relief 
for homeowners. Like a matching grant, STAR changes the price of public services, thereby 
altering the incentives of voters and school officials and leading to unintended consequences. 
Using data for New York State school districts before and after STAR was implemented, we find 
that STAR resulted in small increases in student performance along with significant decreases in 
the efficiency with which this performance is delivered and significant increases in school 
spending and property tax rates. These tax-rate increases magnify existing inequities in New 
York State’s education finance system. 
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Introduction 
 Thanks to a relatively low state share of funding for education and a wide range in 
property values per pupil, New York State has long faced the dual problem of high property tax 
rates and severe funding disparities across school districts. In 1997, New York State enacted a 
state-funded homestead exemption, the School Tax Relief Program or STAR, to provide property 
tax relief for homeowners. Although it was not recognized in the policy debates at the time 
STAR was passed, the use of state tax sources to lower the school property tax burden on 
homeowners significantly alters the way public schools are financed and magnifies the funding 
disparities. Moreover, the design of STAR has resulted in major unintended consequences for 
student performance, school spending, school district efficiency, and local property tax rates. 
This impact on school finance and these unintended consequences are the subjects of this paper. 
 These issues were first raised by Duncombe and Yinger (1998a, 2001). Building on the 
equivalence theorems of Bradford and Oates (Oates, 1972; Bradford and Oates, 1971a, 1971b), 
they argued that the STAR homestead exemption was equivalent to a form of matching aid. Like 
matching aid, STAR lowers voters’ tax prices and therefore is likely to increase the demand for 
education and lead to higher property tax rates, higher education spending, and higher student 
performance. Duncombe and Yinger also argued that the STAR-induced decline in tax price 
lowers voters’ incentives to monitor school officials and therefore may result in less efficient 
school districts. In this paper we estimate the impact of STAR on student performance, school 
district expenditures, school district efficiency, and school property tax rates. 
 Many studies find that tax prices have a significant impact on the demand for local 
services.1  Fisher (1988), Addonizio (1990, 1991), and Rockoff (2003), explore the impact of 
property tax relief programs on school spending. The first two of these studies examine a circuit-
breaker implemented in Michigan in the 1970s that altered tax prices. Both studies find evidence 
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that these tax-price changes had a significant impact on public spending. Rockoff (2003) 
examines STAR. He finds that replacing 10 percent of school property taxes with STAR funds 
would raise school spending by 1.6 percent.2 
These studies all estimate the elasticity of expenditure per pupil with respect to tax price. 
This approach has the practical advantage that it does not require a measure of the final output 
(in the sense of Bradford, Malt, and Oates, 1969) of education, such as student test scores. It also 
has a major disadvantage, however; it cannot determine whether the impact of tax-price on 
spending reflects changes in demand or changes in school district efficiency. 
 In contrast to the previous literature, this study estimates a demand model with a final 
output as the dependent variable and explicitly considers economies of scale and school district 
efficiency. We estimate the direct impact of STAR on the demand for education and the indirect 
impact that arises because STAR affects efficiency and efficiency affects demand. 
The Structure of STAR and the Distribution of STAR Benefits 
 The STAR program provides partial exemptions from school property taxes for owner-
occupied primary residences.3  The basic STAR exemption is available to all taxpayers who own 
their primary residence in New York State, regardless of age or income, including owners of 
one-, two-, and three-family houses, condominiums, cooperative apartments, mobile homes, or 
residential dwellings that are part of mixed-use property.4  An enhanced STAR exemption is 
available only for homeowners age 65 or above who have annual incomes no greater than 
$60,000.5  Renters receive no exemption. 
 The basic exemptions were $10,000 in 1999-2000, $20,000 in 2000-2001, and $30,000 in 
2001-2002 and thereafter,6 whereas the enhanced exemption was set at $50,000 for the 1998-
1999 school year and has remained at that value ever since. All STAR exemptions are subject to 
two adjustments. First, they are all adjusted to be consistent with the assessment/sales ratio in 
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each assessing unit. Second, they are adjusted upward by a “sales price differential factor” in 
counties in which the median residential sales price exceeds the statewide median sales price.7 
 Although New York has several other property tax exemption programs, STAR is unique 
in two ways (New York State Office of Real Property Services (ORPS), 2004). First, it is the 
only exemption funded by the state. All other exemptions erode the local tax property base and 
shift the burden of the tax toward property owners not eligible for the exemptions. Second, 
STAR is unique in terms of its scope and the size of the exemption. Although some other 
exemption programs have applied to a significant number of taxpayers, including 650,000 
veterans and 180,000 senior citizens, none of them has come close to the breadth of the STAR 
program, which applies to roughly 3 million taxpayers. 
 As shown in Table 1, STAR provided property tax relief per pupil in 2001-2002 ranging 
from $320 in New York City to $1,395 in the downstate suburbs. Because of their high renter 
populations, all the large cities except Yonkers receive relatively little benefit from STAR. Table 
1 also indicates that the STAR exemptions range from 3.61 percent of property value in NYC to 
14.82 percent in the upstate suburbs.  
Conceptual Foundations 
 A voter’s tax price reflects the interplay between the voter’s budget constraint and the 
government budget constraint. In this section we derive an expanded tax price that reflects both 
STAR and school district efficiency and incorporate this tax price into demand and 
cost/efficiency models. We show that STAR has direct impacts on the demand for school quality 
and indirect impacts on demand that arise because STAR also affects efficiency. 
The Demand for School Quality 
Let V stand for the market value of a voter’s home and t indicate the effective property 
tax rate. Without STAR, the property tax payment would be tV. Expressed in terms of market 
value, STAR exempts the first X dollars of value from tax, so the property tax payment with 
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STAR is t(V-X). As noted earlier, the value of X is now $30,000 in most districts, but is 
sometimes adjusted upward for high sales prices.8  If Y is a voter’s income and Z is spending on 
everything except school property taxes, then a voter’s budget constraint with STAR is 
 ( )Y Z t V X= + −  (1) 
 
 The school district faces a cost function, C{S}, where C is total cost per pupil and S is 
school quality as measured by student performance on certain tests. The derivative of this 
function, ∂C/∂S, equals marginal cost, MC. Spending per pupil, E, equals C{S} divided by 
district efficiency, e. This efficiency measure is scaled so that it equals 1.0 in a fully efficient 
district, that is, in a district that makes full use of the best available technology, and falls below 
one in less efficient districts. Hence, this formulation indicates that inefficient districts spend 
more than the amount indicated by C{S} to obtain a given level of S. Revenue comes from 
property taxes and state aid. Because the state fully compensates a district for its STAR 
exemptions, these exemptions have no impact on the district budget constraint. Let V  indicate 
property value per pupil and A indicate state aid per pupil. Then the district budget constraint is     
 { }C SE tV A
e
≡ = +  (2) 
 
 Solving equation (2) for t and substituting the result into equation (1) yields. 
 
 { }1 1V X C S V XY A Z
V V e V V
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ − = + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
 
Tax price, TP, is what an increment in S costs a voter, so it can be derived by differentiating a 
voter’s spending, the right side of equation (3), by S: 
 
 ( )1 1Spending 1 1dC V X V XTP e MC e
S dS V V V V
− −∂ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞≡ = − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (4) 
 
 
The direct impact of STAR appears in the last term of equation (4); an exemption, X, is 
equivalent to a matching aid program with a matching rate m = X/V. This matching rate varies 
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across districts and across time both because of provisions in the STAR legislation, namely, the 
phase in and the sales price differential factor, and because of variation in V. Throughout this 
paper, we refer to X/V as the implicit STAR matching rate and to (1- X/V) as the STAR 
component of tax price. 
 In a standard median-voter model, the demand for school quality, S, is a function of 
median income, as augmented by state aid, and of median tax price. Interpreting equation (1) as 
the median voter’s budget constraint; using a standard multiplicative form for demand; adding a 
flypaper effect, f; and placing other demand determinants in a constant, K, we find that9 
 ( ) 11 1V X V XS K Y f A MC e
V V V V
θ µ
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (5) 
 
where θ is the income elasticity of demand, µ is the (negative) price elasticity of demand. Our 
principal hypothesis is that the STAR term, (1 – X/V), has a negative coefficient. 
Tax price in equation (5) has four components: marginal cost, (the inverse of) efficiency, 
tax share, and STAR. These components all enter tax price in the same way but may have 
different elasticities in practice. Voters may be more aware of, and hence more responsive to, the 
STAR component than to the tax-share component, for example, because they must apply for the 
STAR rebate. Thus, we estimate all four elasticities and use them in our simulations; to simplify 
the presentation, however, we use a single elasticity in the text. 
Equation (5) also reveals that STAR affects the value of aid to voters. In the standard 
model, the value to a voter of state aid depends on the voter’s tax share, that is, on the voter’s 
share of the money saved by cutting local taxes (Oates, 1972). This effect explains why tax share 
appears in the augmented income term. Equation (5) shows that STAR exemptions also lower a 
voter’s valuation of aid. We later test for this effect, which is discussed in Duncombe and Yinger 
(1998a) and Rockoff (2003).  
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The Determinants of School Efficiency and Educational Cost  
 Although e in equation (5) cannot be measured directly, it may depend on both income 
augmented by aid and on tax price. This insight leads to a method for estimating e and for 
determining STAR’s indirect impact on demand, which operates through efficiency. 
As pointed out by Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997) and Duncombe and Yinger 
(1997, 1998b) income may affect efficiency in two ways. First, a higher income may weaken 
voters’ incentives to monitor school officials. Second, a higher income may encourage voters to 
push for a broader set of objectives. Because efficiency must be defined relative to spending on a 
particular objective, such as student performance on certain tests, spending to promote other 
objectives is inefficient. Given this role of voter demand and monitoring, we use the same 
definition of income in the efficiency equation as in the demand equation. 
These studies also provide evidence that a tax-price decrease operates in much the same 
way as an income increase, namely, it weakens voters’ incentives to monitor school officials and 
boosts their demand for a broad set of objectives. Thus, tax price also belongs in the efficiency 
equation. As in the case of income, the role of voter behavior in this analysis indicates that the 
tax-price term in the efficiency equation, like the one in the demand equation, should reflect tax 
share, marginal cost, and STAR.10 
Our approach is to incorporate these hypotheses into a multiplicative efficiency equation. 
For expositional purposes (but not in our estimations), we assume that the flypaper effect is the 
same in the efficiency equation as in the demand equation. Determinants of efficiency other than 
augmented income and tax-price, which are discussed below, are represented by M. This 
approach leads to the following efficiency equation, where γ is the income elasticity of efficiency, 
δ is the price elasticity of efficiency, and k is a constant: 
 ( )1 1V X V Xe k M Y f A MC
V V V V
γ δ
ρ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (6) 
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Based on the literature, we expect that a higher augmented income leads to less efficiency (γ < 0) 
and that a higher tax price leads to more efficiency (δ > 0). 
Efficiency cannot be measured directly, but its determinants can be incorporated into the 
estimation of a cost function (Duncombe and Yinger, 2001). Following standard practice 
(Downes and Pogue, 1994; Duncombe and Yinger, 1997, 1998b, 2000; Reschovsky and Imazeki, 
1998, 2001, 2003), we assume that educational cost depends, in a multiplicative way, on teacher 
salaries, W, student enrollment, N, and pupil characteristics, P. Unlike previous studies, however, 
we estimate returns to quality scale (as defined in Duncombe and Yinger, 1993). In symbols, 
 { }C S S W N Pσ α β λκ=  (7) 
 
where κ is a constant and σ measures returns to scale; σ < 1.0 indicates increasing returns and σ > 
1 indicates decreasing returns. This cost function implies that marginal cost is not constant:    
 1{ }C SMC S W N P
S
σ α β λσ κ −∂≡ =
∂
 (8) 
Substituting equations (6)-(8) into the definition of E in equation (2), we find that 
 ( )( )1* ( 1) 1 1V X V XE k S W N P M Y f A V V V V
γ δ
δσ δ σ α β λ ρ
− −
−− − −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (9) 
 
where k* combines the constants in equations (6)-(8). Taking logs and, for augmented income, 
using the simplification that ln{1+α}≈ α when α is less than one, yields our estimating equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*ln ln ( 1) ln (1 ) ln (1 ) ln (1 ) ln
ln ln 1 ln ln 1
E k S W N P
A V X V XM Y f
Y V V V V
σ δ σ α δ β δ λ δ
ρ γ γ δ δ
= + − − + − + − + −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − − − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
(10) 
 
This equation identifies all the parameters in equations (6) and (7) except the constant 
terms, which are not needed to calculate cost and efficiency indexes. The efficiency price 
elasticity, δ, equals minus one multiplied by the coefficient of the tax-share variable. Once δ is 
known, the values of the cost parameters, α, β, and λ, can be determined from the coefficients of 
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the cost variables. Since δ is expected to be positive, omitting this correction is likely to result in 
an understatement of the impact of wages, enrollment, and student characteristics on educational 
costs. The efficiency income elasticity, γ, is the negative of the coefficient of ln(Y), and the 
flypaper effect, f, is the coefficient of the aid variable divided by -γ. The economies-of-scale 
parameter, σ, can be found using the coefficient of ln(S) and the estimate of δ. 
The three components of tax-price in equation (6) may not have the same elasticities. We 
can estimate separate elasticities for the last two terms, but not for the first, which appears in all 
the coefficients in the first line of (10). We assume that the elasticity of e with respect to MC 
equals the estimated elasticity of e with respect to /V V .11 
Other approaches to estimating efficiency have appeared in the literature. One approach 
has been developed by Ray (1991), McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993), and Duncombe and Yinger 
(1997, 1998b).12  This approach involves two steps. The first step is to estimate the minimum 
spending frontier for any combination of student outcomes using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA).13  DEA produces an index that captures both efficiency and differences in spending due 
to differences in wage costs or student characteristics that affect the cost of education. The 
second step is to regress the DEA index on cost variables and on variables thought to influence 
efficiency. The coefficients of this regression can then be used to remove the impact of the cost 
variables from the DEA index, leaving a measure of efficiency. DEA is designed to identify 
production frontiers with multiple outputs, but is not necessary or appropriate with a single 
output, as in the case of our education-performance index.14  
Implications of the Link between Demand and Efficiency  
Once equation (10) has been estimated, two approaches are available for estimating the 
demand equation (5), and hence for determining the indirect impact of STAR on demand through 
efficiency. The first approach is to use the estimated parameters from (10), along with equations 
(6) and (8), to calculate indexes of MC and e for every district. The problem with this approach is 
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that both MC and e (through MC) are functions of S, so that these two variables are endogenous 
by definition. Moreover, it may be impossible to find instruments for addressing this endogeneity 
because variables correlated with the impact of scale economies in MC and e, which operate 
through S, are, by definition, correlated with the dependent variable, namely, S. 
The second approach is to exploit the multiplicative form of these equations to solve for S, 
that is, to eliminate S from the right side of the demand equation. This approach complicates the 
interpretation of the estimated parameters in the demand equation, but it eliminates the 
troublesome type of endogeneity just described. The first step in this approach is to calculate 
partial indexes for the components of cost and efficiency that do not involve S: 
 * *C W N Pα β λσκ=  (11) 
and  
 
 
* ** *1 1V X V Xe k M Y f A C
V V V V
γ δ
ρ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (12) 
where κ* is defined so that C* equals 1.0 in the average district and k** is defined so that e* equals 
one in the most efficient district. This scaling alters the constant term in our demand regression, 
but does not alter any other estimated coefficient. When estimated, equation (10) includes an 
error term. As discussed below, C* can only be identified through its links to factors outside the 
control of school officials, namely, W, N, and P. Thus, we assume that this error term reflects 
unobserved components of efficiency, not cost, and we include it in our efficiency index.  
 Now substituting equations (6) and (8) into equation (5) and making use of equations (11) 
and (12), we can write the demand function as: 
 ( )( )
* *
1* * *1 1V X V XS K Y f A C e
V V V V
θ µ
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (13) 
where 
 
 *
1 ( 1)(1 )
θθ
µ σ δ
=
− − −
 (14) 
and 
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 *
1 ( 1)(1 )
µµ
µ σ δ
=
− − −
 (15) 
 
Equation (13) can be estimated by taking logs and using the approximation for the aid term 
derived earlier. The values of σ and δ come from the estimation of equation (10). Equation (15) 
can be used to find µ based on the coefficient of the tax-share term in equation (13). Equation (14) 
can then be used to find θ based on the coefficient of the income term in equation (13), which 
leads, in turn to a value for f based on the coefficient of the aid term. Note that θ = θ* and µ = µ* 
when there are constant returns to quality scale (σ = 1).  
Because e* depends on augmented income and tax-price, substituting equation (12) into 
equation (13) yields another form for the demand function, namely, 
 ( )
* * *(1 )
** * 1 * 1V X V XS K M Y f A C
V V V V
θ γµ µ δ
ρµ
− −
− ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (16) 
 
Equation (16) has two important implications. First, when efficiency is omitted from the demand 
equation, the estimated “income” elasticity is (θ* - γµ*) and the estimated “price” elasticity is 
µ*(1 - δ), which are smaller (in absolute value) than θ and µ, respectively (or than θ* and µ*). 
The same issues arise when e is omitted from an expenditure form of the demand 
equation, which is equation (16) multiplied by MC/e with the assumption of constant returns to 
scale (σ = 1). This is the approach used by Rockoff (2003). In this case, the coefficient of the 
income term is [θ - γ(µ+1)] and the coefficient of the tax-price term is [µ - δ(µ+1)].15  Even if the 
assumption of constant returns is correct, the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as 
income and price elasticities of demand unless γ and δ are assumed to be zero. Including district 
fixed effects and regional time trends to account for efficiency, the Rockoff (2003) strategy, does 
not eliminate the extra terms in these coefficients because e is directly affected by STAR and 
varies over time in each district.16 
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The Rockoff approach provides a demand interpretation for an expenditure equation that 
is quite different from the cost/efficiency interpretation we give to equation (9). Nevertheless, 
these two interpretations are not inconsistent. Under the demand interpretation, an expenditure 
equation explores the demand for a broad but unspecified set of educational outcomes, whereas 
we explore cost and efficiency in providing a specific school performance index. A finding that 
the demand for a broad set of education outcomes increases with district income or decreases 
with district tax price implies that an income increase or a tax-price decrease encourages a 
district to provide a broader set of educational outcomes, which is equivalent to becoming more 
inefficient in delivering the performance index in our analysis. Overall, both interpretations are 
legitimate, but the cost interpretation has the great advantage that it does not require the 
assumptions that σ equals 1 and that γ and δ equal zero.17 
The second implication of equation (16) is that, even with constant returns, the impact of 
STAR on the demand for S has two direct components, a price effect and a change in the value of 
A, and two indirect components, which operate through efficiency. By lowering tax price, STAR 
gives a direct boost to demand, but it also lowers efficiency, which indirectly results in lower 
demand. The net impact of these two responses is summarized by the µ(1 - δ) exponent. The 
(negative) price elasticity, µ, indicates the direct effect; it is offset to some degree by the product 
of δ, which is positive, and µ. In addition, by lowering the value of aid to a voter, STAR lowers 
demand, but this drop in augmented income also leads to higher efficiency, which indirectly 
boosts demand. The net impact of these two responses is summarized by the (θ - γµ) exponent. 
The positive price elasticity, θ, is offset, at least in part, by the product of γ (negative) and µ. 
 The simulations in a later section incorporate the exact form of these indirect effects, but 
it is instructive at this point to examine them using calculus approximations. With constant 
returns, differentiating equation (16) respect to m = X/V reveals that the impact of STAR on S is18  
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The first term in equation (17) is the net income effect and the second term is the net price effect. 
The second term shows that the direct positive price impact of STAR on S, -µ, is offset to some 
degree by the indirect effect, µδ, that arises because STAR has a price impact on efficiency, 
which in turn affects S. Without constant returns, θ and µ in equation (17) must be replaced by θ* 
and µ* as defined by equations (14) and (15). 
Using the expenditure form of the demand equation, again with constant returns, we can 
also derive the impact of STAR on E: 
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 (18) 
 
In this case, the elasticity expressions in the numerators summarize the direct impacts of STAR 
on efficiency and the direct and indirect impacts of STAR on S and hence on C.19 
The district budget constraint, equation (2), implies that  
 ln{ } ln{ }d E E X Edt d EX V V V
V
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 (19) 
 
Not surprisingly, that the impact of STAR on property taxes has the same sign as its impact on 
spending, regardless of scale economies. Finally, we can differentiate (6) to determine the impact 
of STAR on school district efficiency. The result with σ =1 is:20  
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STAR raises efficiency by cutting the value of aid to voters (the first term) but also lowers 
efficiency by lowering voters’ tax prices (the second term). Without constant returns, the 
coefficient in the numerator of the first term becomes [γ + θ*(σ-1)δ] and the coefficient in the 
numerator of the second term becomes [δ + µ*(σ-1)δ]. The increase in S caused by STAR raises 
the marginal cost of S, thereby boosting efficiency and offsetting, at least in part, the drop in 
efficiency associated with the STAR implicit matching rate.  
Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results 
Our conceptual framework calls for the estimation of two equations:  the cost/efficiency 
equation (10) and the demand equation (13). In this section we describe our data and present our 
strategy for estimating each of these equations. 
Data 
Our data come from ORPS, the New York State Comptroller, the U.S. Census, and the 
New York State Education Department (SED). Every two years ORPS conducts a survey to 
examine the relationship between assessed and market value in each assessing unit. The survey 
results are used to estimate an assessment ratio, also called the equalization rate, by property type 
for each assessing unit. As indicated earlier, this equalization rate is used to adjust the STAR 
exemption amounts whenever property is not assessed at full value. In addition, ORPS collects a 
parcel-level assessment data set that contains information on assessment, location, and property 
type information for all the parcels in New York State. The decennial Census provides 
information on median house value in each school district, based on owners’ estimates. 
The two property value variables are the tax share, /V V , and the implicit STAR 
matching rate, X/V, where V is median house value and V  is total property value per pupil. Total 
taxable property value is total assessed value minus all property tax exemptions, except STAR, 
multiplied by the state-determined equalization rate, which converts the total to a market value. 
Dividing this total by the number of pupils yields V . 
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We do not have an ideal measure of V. The ORPS data covers all houses, but most school 
districts are in several different assessing units, which use different assessing methods and are on 
different assessing cycles (see Eom, 2004).21   The state equalization procedures provide a partial 
correction for this variation in assessing practices, but they are based on a small sample of 
houses and do not provide a full correction. The Census measure is more insulated from 
assessment procedures, but it is available only every ten years.22  Thus, our measure of median 
house value is the Census measure updated by the annual percentage change in total residential 
property value (from ORPS).23 
Table 2 presents key tax-price components and describes key variables before and after 
STAR was implemented. The first column indicates that the STAR component of tax price was 
68 percent in the average district, which is equivalent to a matching rate of 32 percent, and 
ranged from 51 percent in the poor upstate large cities to 82 percent in the downstate suburbs.24  
This difference would be even greater were it not for the sales price differential factor. Table 2 
also shows that the median voter’s tax-share was 36 percent in the average district in 2002. 
These variables do not account for renters. This approach can be justified by the 
argument that renters may not care about the level of public services; after all, any improvement 
in public services may lead to an offsetting increase in rent (Ross and Yinger, 1999).25  Because 
STAR does not apply to renters, however, we also investigate the possibility, reflected in the 
second column of Table 2, that the appropriate STAR matching rate is zero in majority-renter 
districts. The tax-share variable also might take a form different from the one in equation (2) in 
these districts, but this possibility is accounted for by the fixed effects in our models.26  
Table 2 also shows that the average property tax rate to support operating spending 
equaled 1.56 percent before STAR and 1.66 after STAR was implemented, an increase of 
((1.66/1.56)) - 1) = 6.12 percent. These are tax rates to cover school operating costs, not overall 
tax rates. Following equation (2), they are defined as the difference between operating spending 
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and operating aid divided by total property value. Because property values change for many 
reasons that have nothing to do with STAR, Table 2 also presents an alternative tax rate 
calculation for 2002 in which the property tax base is held constant in real terms. By this 
measure, the property tax increased ((1.86/1.56)) - 1) = 19.35 percent over this period. Moreover, 
real spending per pupil increased ((11,756/10,664)) - 1) = 10.23 percent, and student 
performance (discussed below) increased ((75.5/72.0)) - 1) = 4.79 percent. Our objective is to 
determine the extent to which these changes can be attributed to STAR. 
In the case of educational outcomes, our approach is to design an index that (1) covers a 
range of student performance measures, (2) draws on existing literature and preliminary 
regressions to identify performance measures valued by voters,27 and (3) is based on variables 
measured consistently across the years in our panel. This approach leads us to the share of 
students scoring above a state-determined standard reference point on mathematics and English 
examinations in the fourth and eighth grades. The examinations are central to New York State’s 
accountability system and SED publishes the test results as part of each school’s annual report 
card. In addition, it leads us to the share of high-school students who have not dropped out by 
their scheduled graduation date.28   These variables are combined into an index based on each 
district’s fourth-grade passing rate (the average for math and English), eighth-grade passing rate 
(math and English), and non-dropout rate. Our baseline case gives equal weight to each measure, 
but we also examine an alternative weighting scheme. Our efficiency measure, or any other, 
depends on the performance measures selected. Thus, our efficiency measure and the cost and 
demand models that include it should be interpreted as illustrative results for one performance 
index, not as general results that apply regardless of how performance is measured. 
Descriptive information on our performance index and other variables is provided in 
Table 3. All dollar figures are deflated using the CPI. 
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Cost/Efficiency Model 
Because efficiency cannot be measured directly, both our approach to estimating an 
efficiency model, equation (10), and the DEA-based approach require explanatory variables to be 
classified as cost factors or efficiency factors. Although a classification scheme cannot be 
formally tested, the conceptual basis for the scheme used here is solidly grounded in the existing 
literature. This scheme is founded on the view that cost factors are outside a district’s control 
whereas efficiency factors describe incentives that influence the district’s behavior. 
The link between input prices and costs is, of course, part of the standard theory of the 
firm. Our salary variable is for teachers with one to five years of experience, holding constant 
experience and education. Because unobserved school district traits may affect both spending 
and salaries, this variable is treated as endogenous. An extensive literature, starting with 
Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1969) develops the argument that educational costs depend on 
student characteristics. Following the cost studies cited earlier, our variables include the 
percentage of students eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch, with limited English proficiency, 
from a single-parent family, or with severe disabilities. In addition, many studies establish a link 
between educational costs and school district size (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger, 2002). 
Following standard practice, we allow for a U-shaped relationship between size and costs. 
The literature on the determinants of efficiency is summarized in Duncombe, Miner, and 
Ruggiero (1997) and hypotheses in this literature are tested in Duncombe and Yinger (1997 
1998b, 2001). As expressed in equation (6), efficiency-determinants include the components of 
augmented income and tax share. Augmented income can be separated into income and aid terms, 
as in equation (10). Some state aid comes in the form of closed-ended matching aid for 
transportation and construction, which might affect non-transportation operating spending. We 
assume that each district has reached the maximum aid amount, so we can specify this aid in 
lump-sum form. We could not reject the hypothesis that impact of this aid in the cost/efficiency 
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equation (and in the demand equation) was the same as that of standard operating aid. As a result, 
the models we present are all based on total state aid.29  
Our regressions include several other efficiency variables. In New York, school districts 
rely heavily on the property tax. Thus, property value per pupil is a measure of a district’s fiscal 
capacity and we hypothesize that voters in high-property-wealth districts are not as motivated as 
voters in other districts to reign in spending that is not devoted to the most basic student 
performance measures. We also include the share of adults with college educations and the 
percentage of housing units that are owner-occupied as monitoring variables. More educated 
voters and homeowners may be more concerned about education quality than other voters, all 
else equal. Finally, several studies argue that school officials will respond to competition by 
operating in a more efficient manner (Hoxby 2000, 2001). We measure competition by including 
the share of school-aged children in the district enrolled in private schools.  
Our estimation treats student performance and teacher salary as endogenous. Instruments 
for these endogenous variables are drawn from nearby districts. This approach is based on the 
hypothesis that each district’s decisions about performance and salaries are influenced by the 
decisions of nearby districts, and hence by the characteristics of nearby districts that factor into 
their decisions. Because they do not appear directly in a district’s cost function, these 
characteristics of nearby districts therefore qualify as instruments. We defined a set of potential 
instruments consisting of the average, minimum, and maximum values for adjacent districts and 
for all the districts in the same county for a list of student characteristics, performance levels, 
physical characteristics, and fiscal capacity measures. These potential instruments were then put 
through a series of tests before the final instruments for the cost model were selected.30 
  The estimated parameters from equation (10) are used to calculate cost and efficiency 
indexes for the demand estimation. The cost index, based on equation (11), is scaled to equal 1.0 
in the average district. The efficiency index, based on equation (12), is scaled to equal 1.0 in the 
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most efficient district. This efficiency index includes the error terms from the estimated version 
of equation (10), that is, it assumes that unobserved determinants of spending are associated with 
efficiency, not with cost. To put it another way, nothing is included in our cost index unless it 
can be explicitly linked to a cost variable outside the control of school officials. 
An estimation of equation (10) with district fixed effects is presented in column (1) of 
Table 4. The STAR tax price has a significant impact on efficiency, with an elasticity of 0.088.31  
This result supports the hypothesis that the more STAR lowers a district’s tax price, the more 
inefficient that district becomes.32  The STAR elasticity is larger than the tax-share elasticity, 
0.047, which is also statistically significant. This result suggests that the tax-price variation 
associated with STAR is more readily perceived by voters than is the variation associated with 
the composition of the property tax base. Two non-price efficiency variable are statistical 
significant, namely, property value per pupil and total state aid. Because the income variable has 
a small, insignificant coefficient, the estimated flypaper effect is very high, namely 20.68. 
The coefficient of ln{S}is 0.871. Using the coefficient of tax-share to identify δ and the 
formula in equation (9), we find that σ = 0.866, which indicates modestly increasing returns to 
quality scale. The only other cost variable that is statistically significant is enrollment, which has 
the expected negative sign, indicating increasing returns to population scale. 
Column (2) of Table 4 tests the hypothesis that STAR affects voters’ valuation of state 
aid by estimating separate coefficients for the two aid terms in equation (10), namely, 
( / )( / )A Y V V  and ( / )( / )( / )A Y V V X V− . The second term isolates the impact of STAR. Both 
terms are statistically significant with the expected signs, which indicates that STAR does 
influence voter’s valuation of aid. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that these terms 
have the same absolute value, so we use the specification in the first column as our base case.  
Next, we test the hypothesis that the effective STAR matching rate is zero in majority-
renter districts by including an additional variable in equation (10). This variable is R [ln((1/(1-
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(X/V)))] = R [ln(V/(V-X))], where R = 1 in majority-renter districts and zero otherwise. The 
elasticity of efficiency with respect to the STAR tax-price component in majority-renter districts 
equals the coefficient of this variable minus the coefficient of the STAR tax-price component in 
equation (10). A finding that these two coefficients are equal implies that there is no response to 
the STAR tax price in a majority-renter district, whereas a finding that the coefficient of this new 
variable equals zero implies that voters in a majority-renter district, like those in majority-owner 
districts, respond to the STAR tax-price component facing the median homeowner. As shown in 
column (3) of Table 4, the coefficient of this variable is small and statistically insignificant. We 
conclude that the formulation in equation (10) accurately describes the impact of the STAR tax-
price component on school district efficiency, even in majority-renter districts. This re-affirms 
the results in the column (1). 
Column (4) addresses the possible bias from unobservable time-dependent variables by 
introducing year fixed effects. With these effects, the STAR coefficient has the wrong sign but is 
close to zero and no longer significant statistically. The coefficient of the outcome index also 
drops markedly in magnitude and also no longer significant. The most plausible explanation for 
these results is that adding the year fixed effects effectively removes so much variation in these 
variables that their coefficients cannot be precisely estimated; however, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the results in earlier columns are biased due to unobserved time-related variables. 
We return to this issue below. 
The final column of Table 4 presents the results for a model with different weights in the 
outcome index, namely weights of 25 percent for fourth-grade scores and the non-dropout rate 
and 50 percent for eighth-grade scores. This STAR elasticity is somewhat larger with these 
weights than with our original weights (0.099 vs. 0.088) and the coefficient of the index itself is 
somewhat smaller (0.605 vs. 0.871). Nevertheless, the results in columns (1) and (5) are similar, 
which indicates that our results are not highly sensitive to the weights we use.  
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A Hausman test indicates that equation (10) should be estimated with district fixed 
effects, not random effects. Nevertheless, the results of the fixed-effects estimation are somewhat 
disappointing, particularly for the cost variables. As cited earlier, many previous studies have 
found that educational costs are linked to wage rates and student characteristics, so these results 
may simply reflect the limited across-time variation in our cost variables. One of these variables, 
the share of single-parent families, does not vary over time at all so its coefficient cannot be 
estimated with district fixed effects. Thus, in order to facilitate the calculation of a cost index, 
which is required for our demand model, we also estimate an alternative model with random 
effects. 
The results are presented in column (1) of Table 5. The estimated tax-price elasticities are 
now 0.158 for the STAR component and 0.071 for the tax-share component. These estimates, 
both of which are statistically significant, are somewhat larger than the fixed-effects versions, 
but they tell the same story, namely, that the STAR incentive does affect efficiency and is 
somewhat stronger than the tax-share incentive. In addition, all the other efficiency variables are 
now significant. Income, property value, total state aid, the share of adults with a college 
education, and the rental share of housing are all highly significant with the expected signs. The 
estimated flypaper effect is now 1.68. In contrast, the share of students in private schools 
unexpectedly has a positive coefficient, which is significant.33 
Most of the cost variables are now statistically significant with the expected signs. The 
coefficient of ln{S}drops to 0.368 but is still statistically significant. Educational costs rise, as 
expected with wage costs, but the elasticity is small. We also find a U-shaped relationship 
between enrollment and cost per pupil, but the elasticity of costs with respect to teacher salaries 
is small. Costs also increase significantly with the share of students who speak English as a 
second language or have a single parent. 
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Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 test two hypotheses in the random-effects model:  that 
STAR affect’s voter’s valuation of state aid and that the perceived STAR tax price component is 
different in majority-owner and majority-renter districts. As in the case of fixed-effects model, 
we accept the first hypothesis and reject the second. Column (4) adds year fixed effects. In 
contrast to Table 5, these effects now have little impact on the STAR elasticity, which is 
somewhat smaller, 0.096, but still statistically significant. Column (5) switches to the alternative 
performance index; as in Table 5, these results are similar to those in column (1). 
Demand Model 
The second part of our analysis is to estimate equation (13) in log form. The dependant 
variable is the log of our student performance index. The key explanatory variables are the log of 
augmented income and of tax price; we use the same approximation for the aid term in 
augmented income that we used in the efficiency equation and we estimate a separate elasticity 
for each tax-price component. The efficiency component is treated as endogenous. To account 
for unobservable factors, we estimate this model with district fixed effects.34   
Table 6 presents demand results based on cost and efficiency indexes from the fixed-
effects cost/efficiency models in Table 4. The estimated demand coefficients in this case are 
0.250, -0.547, -0.076, and -0.158 for the cost, efficiency, tax-share, and STAR components of tax 
price, respectively. All these coefficients are statistically significant, but the coefficient for the 
cost index has the wrong sign, probably because the fixed-effects cost/efficiency models are 
unable to estimate reasonable cost parameters. Using equations (14) and (15), adjusted to allow 
for differences across tax-price components, we find that the underlying price elasticities for 
these four components are 0.259, -0.569, -0.073, and -0.152. The last elasticity supports our main 
hypothesis:  STAR boosts the demand for student performance. Moreover, the responsiveness to 
STAR is about twice the responsiveness to variation in the tax share. 
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In addition, Column (1) of Table 6 indicates that income has a significant impact on the 
demand for student performance with a coefficient (elasticity) equal to 0.047 (0.049). The state 
aid variable also is highly significant with the expected sign. The estimated flypaper effect is 
10.46, which is smaller than the associated flypaper effect in Table 4. As in the efficiency 
equation, we test the hypothesis that STAR alters the weight voters place on state aid. As shown 
in column (2), we find support for this hypothesis.  
Many scholars, including Inman (1978), have argued that the demand for public services 
may depend on the socioeconomic characteristics of a community. Rockoff (2003) calculates 
separate STAR tax-price variables for elderly and non-elderly homeowners, on the grounds that 
elderly homeowners have higher implicit STAR matching rates and might influence district 
decisions even though they are not the median voter. His elderly tax-price variable is statistically 
significant in his spending model, but only when elderly homeowners are a small fraction of the 
population—the opposite of expectations. He concludes that the role of group size is not “well 
identified.” Rockoff also finds that the coefficient of an interaction between the STAR matching 
rate and the share of public utility property is positive and significant.35 
Our ability to study these issues is limited, because most of our community 
characteristics come from the 2000 U.S. Census and therefore do not vary over time in our 
sample, and our district fixed effects already remove all time-invariant variation.36  Nevertheless, 
we explore the role of renters using the strategy described earlier for the cost/efficiency equation. 
The results are presented in column (3) of Table 6. We find, surprisingly, that majority-renter 
districts are slightly (but significantly) more responsive to the STAR component of tax-price 
than are majority-owner districts. To be specific, the estimated coefficient for the STAR 
component is -0.152 in majority-owner districts and -0.226 in majority-renter districts. 
Column (4) addresses the possible bias from unobservable time-dependent variables by 
introducing year fixed effects. This regression makes use of cost and efficiency indexes based on 
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column (4) of Table 4, in which year fixed effects also appear. This model does not perform well. 
None of the coefficients is statistically significant and the coefficient of the STAR tax-price 
component has the wrong sign. We believe that the methodology in this regression compounds 
the problem that confronts the regression in column (4) of Table 4, namely that it effectively 
eliminates so much variation in the explanatory variables that their coefficients cannot be 
estimated. In the following section we consider an alternative possibility, namely that our other 
models are biased by unobserved time-dependent variables. 
Column (5) of Table 6 re-estimates the model using the alternative outcome index 
described earlier. All of the estimated coefficients, including the coefficient of the STAR 
component of tax price, are larger in absolute value with this alternative index.  
Column (6) of Table 6 presents results from a demand model that excludes all efficiency 
variables, including the efficiency index. According to equation (16), when efficiency is 
excluded the coefficient of income term becomes (θ* - γµ*), and the coefficient of the STAR term 
becomes µ*(1 - δ). This equation does not quite fit our estimations because it assumes that the 
flypaper effect is the same in both the cost/efficiency and demand equations and that STAR 
affects the value of aid to voters in both equations. Nevertheless, we can approximate this 
equation by imposing these two assumptions and using our estimated parameters. These steps 
lead us to predict that in a demand equation without efficiency variables the coefficient of the 
income term will be 0.033 and the coefficient of the STAR term will be -0.099. The actual 
estimated values in column (5) of Table 6, 0.025 and -0.089, respectively, are remarkably close 
to these predictions, thereby giving support to our interpretation of this equation. 
Table 7 presents comparable results for demand models based on cost and efficiency 
indexes from the random-effects cost/efficiency models in Table 5. In the basic model (column 
(1)), the estimated coefficient (elasticity) for income is 0.137 (0.146) and the flypaper effect is 
3.49. In addition, the estimated coefficients (elasticities) are -0.140 (-0.132), -0.648 
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(-0.619), -0.094 (-0.100), and -0.187 (-0.199) for the cost, efficiency, tax-share, and STAR 
components of tax price, respectively. All these coefficients are statistically significant, although 
the one for cost is significant at only the 5 percent one-tailed level. In contrast to Table 6, the  
cost elasticity now has the expected negative sign, which supports our conclusion that district 
fixed effects in the cost/efficiency model make it impossible to obtain a meaningful cost index. 
The other elasticities are similar to those in Table 6. These results confirm our key predictions:  
Voters perceive STAR as a cut in tax price; price elasticities depend on institutional details. 
The next two columns test the hypotheses that STAR influences voters’ valuation of aid 
and that majority-renter and majority-owner districts respond differently to the price incentive in 
STAR. As in Table 6, we find support for both hypotheses but the direction of the effect in the 
second case is still the opposite of our prediction.  
Column (4) introduces year fixed effects. This regression makes use of cost and 
efficiency indexes based on column (4) of Table 5. In contrast to Table 6, this alternative 
procedure does not undermine the STAR coefficient; in fact, the coefficient is larger (in absolute 
value) in column (4) than in column (1). This procedure also boosts the coefficient of every other 
variable except the cost index. The decline in this coefficient probably reflects the inability of the 
cost/efficiency equation in column (4) of Table 5 to identify the role of educational costs. 
Column (5) shows that, as in Table 6, the results are similar to column (1) when our 
alternative performance index is used. Finally, column (6) shows what happens when the 
efficiency variable is dropped. As in Table 6, the estimated values for the income and STAR 
terms, 0.001 and -0.081, are close to the values predicted from equation (16), -0.010 and -0.107.  
The Role of Unobserved Time-Dependent Variables 
The insignificant coefficients for the STAR tax-price component when year fixed effects 
are added to district fixed effects in both the cost/efficiency and demand models suggest that the 
coefficients of this variable in the other models might be biased upward (in absolute value) by 
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the omission of unobserved time-dependent variables. Indeed, recent years have witnessed 
dramatic changes in education policy at both the state and federal level. Virtually every state has 
implemented an accountability program, ranging from school report cards to high-stakes testing, 
which means that students must pass certain tests in order to graduate from high school. 
Moreover, the federal government passed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) which imposes 
many new responsibilities on schools. All of these changes influence student performance and 
school spending, and therefore might be important unobserved factors in regressions like ours. 
In fact, however, none of these changes occurred in New York during our sample period. 
School report cards; the state accountability system, which places the lowest-performing schools 
“under registration review”; and tests as graduation requirements all were implemented before 
1998-99.37  Moreover, NCLB was passed in 2002 and implemented in 2002-2003. Overall, we 
find no evidence that our analysis omits time-related changes in education policy and conclude 
that regressions without year fixed effects accurately estimate the impacts of STAR. 
Although these changes in education policy did not occur during our sample period, our 
framework provides a way to study them with different data. Adding appropriate indicator 
variables to equations like ours might determine whether the introduction of high-stakes testing 
or the NCLB requirements alter school district efficiency or the demand for school performance. 
Full impacts of STAR 
Table 8 presents simulated impacts of STAR on student performance, school district 
efficiency, school spending, and property tax rates. These impacts are based on the results in 
Tables 4 through 7 combined with data on individual districts and the equations derived earlier.38  
Although the derivatives in equations (17) to (20) provide some helpful initial intuition about 
these calculations, they are approximations and they make two assumptions not used for Table 8, 
namely, equal flypaper effects in the cost/efficiency and demand equations and equal elasticities 
for the various components of tax price. Table 8 presents results using both the fixed- and 
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random-effects estimation of the cost/efficiency equation. The results are similar, so we focus on 
panel B, which is based on the first columns of Tables 5 and 7.  
 According to our simulations, STAR raised student performance by 4.45 percent in the 
average district (column (1)). This result indicates that the positive direct impact of STAR on 
demand, which is indicated by the demand elasticity for the STAR tax-price component (-0.199), 
is larger in absolute value than the negative indirect impact, which equals minus one times the 
efficiency elasticity for the STAR tax-price component (0.158) multiplied by the demand 
elasticity for the efficiency tax-price component (0.619). Because of economies of scale, this 
STAR-induced increase in S leads to a smaller in costs, namely 1.40 percent (column (2)).  
In addition, STAR resulted in a 6.14 percent drop in the efficiency with which the 
average school district delivers our performance index (column (3)). The total efficiency loss 
from STAR is $1.32 billion. As explained earlier, this efficiency loss may include waste in the 
traditional sense, but we suspect that it mainly reflects the fact that the incentives in STAR lead 
voters to push for spending on objectives other than the ones in our index. In other words, STAR 
induced school districts in New York State to increase their annual spending on objectives other 
than boosting fourth and eighth grade test scores and keeping student in high school by as much 
as $1.32 billion. Although these other objectives are valued by voters, the State’s expressed 
interest in test scores and graduation rates as central elements of its accountability program 
implies that this is an expensive unintended consequence of STAR. This efficiency cost could be 
higher or lower, of course, for another set of performance objectives. 
The small performance increase combined with the large efficiency decrease resulted in a 
substantial spending increase, 8.14 percent, in the average district (column (4)). To fund this 
increase, the average district raised its property tax rate by 21.33 percent. The average pre-STAR 
property tax rate for operating spending was 1.56 percent (Table 2), so this is equivalent to a rate 
increase of (1.56)(0.2133) = 0.33 percentage points. In the average district, this tax increase, 
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∆t(V-X), offsets 32.96 percent of the original STAR tax savings, tX, which is an ironic impact for 
a program designed to reduce property taxes (column (6)). Moreover, this tax increase applies to 
all property, including property that does not receive a STAR exemption. 
These simulated STAR impacts are quite similar to the post-pre differences in Table 2, 
which reflect the impacts of factors other than STAR. In fact, our simulated operating-tax-rate 
change is virtually the same as the change in Table 2 that holds property value constant in real 
terms, namely, 19.35 percent. Thus, the recent school tax increases to support operating spending 
in New York appear to be almost entirely due to STAR. The simulated impacts of STAR on 
spending and student performance are also close to the actual changes in Table 2, namely, 10.23 
percent for spending and 4.79 percent for student performance. 
These simulations assume that property values remain constant in real terms. In fact, 
however, property values in New York State increased significantly in real terms in most school 
districts. If the STAR property tax savings were capitalized into house values, some of this 
increase might be due to STAR. In this case, the simulations in column (5) of Table 8 exaggerate 
the impact of STAR on effective tax rates. Although estimating the impact of STAR on property 
values is beyond the scope of this paper, we can calculate the impact of STAR on property tax 
rates assuming full capitalization.39  In this context, however, capitalization is a two-edged sword. 
The capitalization of the STAR exemptions themselves lead to higher property values, but the 
capitalization of the tax rate increases needed to pay for the STAR-induced spending increases 
lower property values. Moreover, the second of these effects, unlike the first, applies to all 
property, not just to single-family homes. As shown in column (7) of Table 8, these two effects 
roughly offset each other, and, in the average district, the tax-rate change with full capitalization 
is virtually the same as the change when capitalization is ignored. 
 Table 8 also shows that the impacts of STAR were not evenly distributed across the state. 
Because the tax-price change induced by STAR depends on the median property value and 
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because majority-renter districts respond to STAR as do majority-owner districts, the tax-price 
impact of STAR are largest in districts with low property values, even if they are cities.40  Thus, 
the impacts of STAR are largest in the upstate rural districts, the upstate small cities, and the 
upstate Big Three districts. These districts experienced relatively large STAR-induced increases 
in student performance, but also strikingly high STAR-induced declines in efficiency and 
increases in tax rate. The impacts of STAR are also particularly small in New York City. 
A comparison of columns (5) and (7) in Table 8 reveals that adding full capitalization 
magnifies the disparities in STAR’s tax-rate impacts. In suburbs, which have little commercial 
and industrial property, the capitalization of STAR exemptions raises house values and lowers 
the required tax rate increase. In large cities, however, the concentration of commercial and 
industrial property implies that the capitalization of STAR-induced tax rate increases for all 
property dominates the capitalization of the STAR exemptions, and the tax-rate increases in 
column (7) are larger than those in column (5). 
Overall, with or without full capitalization, these STAR-induced changes undermine the 
fairness of the education finance system in New York State. 
 
Conclusions 
A state education finance system consists of local property taxes, state-funded property 
tax exemptions, state aid to education, and sometimes other revenue sources. Each of these 
components alters both the incentives facing voters and school officials and the distributions of 
educational outcomes and tax burdens. Proposed changes to any component of this system 
should be evaluated in terms of its impact on the system as a whole. 
When it was passed, the New York’s STAR program was thought to be nothing more 
than a tax-break for local property owners. This paper shows that this perception was not 
accurate, largely because STAR lowers the price voters must pay for additional educational 
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services. By lowering tax price, STAR increased voter’s demand for basic elements of student 
performance, namely fourth- and eighth-grade test scores and non-dropout rates. In addition, 
however, STAR boosted the demand for a broader set of educational outcomes and may have 
encouraged wasteful spending. As a result, STAR significantly lowered the efficiency with 
which these basic elements of student performance were delivered. Because efficiency is also 
part of a voter’s tax price, the direct impact of STAR on the demand for basic student 
performance was partially offset by an indirect impact that operates through efficiency. The net 
increase in basic student performance was about 4 percent in the average district.  
The STAR-induced increases in demand and decreases in efficiency resulted in 
significant increases in school spending and school property tax rates. Ironically, these tax-rate 
increases offset almost one-third of the tax savings from the STAR exemptions. Moreover, these 
efficiency losses and tax-rate increases were particularly large in upstate districts, which include 
some of the neediest districts in the state. Overall, therefore, STAR has done little to close 
performance gaps across the state, but it has shifted the burden of financing education in an 
arbitrary and unfair manner. Although the impacts of STAR do not appear to be sensitive to the 
specific weights in our student performance index, the magnitude of STAR’s impacts could be 
quite different with a fundamentally different measure of school performance. Thus, when 
evaluating changes in property tax policies or other aspects of the education finance system, state 
policy makers should specify their performance objectives and make sure that these objectives 
are not undermined by the unintended consequences of the policies they implement.  
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Endnotes 
 
 
*  We are grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for financial support given to the 
Education Finance and Accountability Program at The Maxwell School. 
 
1.  For reviews of this literature, see Rubinfeld (1987), Ladd and Yinger (1991), Duncombe 
(1996), and Fisher and Papke (2000). 
 
2.  Rockoff (2003) sets district tax price equal to one minus the fraction of local property 
taxes paid by STAR; this formulation differs from the one derived below.  
 
3.  For more on STAR, see New York State Office of Real Property Services (2004). 
 
4.  Fractional amounts of the exemptions are applied if property owners have any other type 
of property that they use partially as a primary residence. To receive the basic exemption, 
all owners of the eligible property must jointly apply on or before the local taxable status 
date. Once the exemption is granted, the owner need not reapply in subsequent years, 
unless the exemption is discontinued or revoked by the assessor. 
 
5.  The income limit applies to the combined income of all owners of the property, including 
the income of any owner’s spouses who reside on the premises. The $60,000 income 
criterion is adjusted annually according to a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) used by 
the Social Security Administration. Eligible property owners must reapply every year for 
the enhanced STAR. 
 
6.  The STAR exemption amount is adjusted for the “big five” cities – New York City, 
Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers – because these school districts are fiscally 
dependent on their city and there is no separate school tax rate. The adjustment factor is 
67 percent for New York City and 67 percent for the others. In addition, the STAR 
legislation gives NYC, but not the other big cities, an extra payment (included in state aid) 
to make up for its high renter share.  
 
7.  The first adjustment simply ensures that the benefits of the STAR exemptions do not 
depend on assessing practices. The second adjustment is a give-away to rich counties and 
is not supported by any public finance principle. See Duncombe and Yinger (1998a). The 
“sales price differential factor” cannot fall below 1.0, so it provides higher exemptions in 
the high-housing-value districts but does not change exemptions elsewhere. All districts 
in downstate counties (Dutchess, Nassau, Putnam, Orange, Rockland, Suffolk, Sullivan, 
and Westchester) have a sales price differential factor greater than one 
 
8.  The adjustment for assessing practices is not relevant here because our model is already 
based on market values, not assessed values. 
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9.  For a review of the literature on the flypaper effect, see Hines and Thaler (1995).; for a 
recent contribution, see Roemer and Silvestre (2002). 
 
10.  We exclude the efficiency component of tax price from the efficiency equation. It makes 
no sense to argue that voters will monitor school officials more actively when a low level 
of monitoring leads to inefficiency! 
 
11.  This assumption is not critical for our conclusions. The simulated impacts of STAR 
would be roughly the same as those presented below if we set the elasticity of e with 
respect to MC equal to zero or if we set it equal to twice the estimated elasticity of e with 
respect to /V V . 
 
12.  Ruggiero (1996) shows how to develop a DEA measure that directly removes the impact 
of cost factors. We have not used this clever approach because it requires a very large 
data set. 
 
13.  DEA uses linear programming to determine a “best-practice frontier” for production. It 
was developed by Farrell (1957), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), and Fare and 
Lovell (1978). Strengths and weaknesses of DEA are discussed in Seiford and Thrall 
(1990) and Ruggiero (1996). DEA is popular for evaluating productive efficiency in the 
public sector because it handles multiple outputs, is nonparametric, and can be applied to 
both production and cost. 
 
14.  Using DEA with the components of our education performance index would result in an 
inconsistency between the weights in our index and the implicit weights estimated 
through DEA. 
 
15.  This step also adds 1 to the exponent of the C* ( = MC) term. 
 
16.  In contrast, these variables do minimize bias that arises from the omission of M and C*, 
which may not vary much over time. 
 
17.  These assumptions about these three parameters might hold with the unspecified broad 
school performance measure in the demand interpretation even if they do not hold with 
the specific measure in the cost interpretation, but there is no way to determine whether 
or not this is true.  
 
18.  These derivatives are evaluated at m = 0 (which corresponds to a starting point without 
STAR), with dm = X/V (which corresponds to implementing STAR), and with σ = 1. 
 
19.  Without constant returns, the coefficients in the numerators become [(θ* - γµ*)(σ(1 - δ) + 
δ) - γ] (first term) and [µ*(1 – δ)(σ(1 - δ) + δ) - δ] (second term).  
 
20.  Without constant returns, the coefficient in the numerator become [γ + θ*(σ-1)δ] (first 
term) and [δ + µ*(σ-1)δ] (second term).  
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21.  Outside cities, assessing units are usually towns (subsets of counties), which are not 
coterminous with school districts. New York State has 993 city and town assessing units, 
two county assessing units, and dozens of small village assessing units. See Eom (2004).  
 
22.  Another disadvantage of the Census measure is that it cannot be corrected for the few 
non-STAR exemptions; this is a minor disadvantage, however, because these specialized 
exemptions (e.g. for veterans) probably do not apply to the median house. 
 
23.  We also explored models using measures of V based on ORPS data only and on Census 
data only. The results are similar to those presented in the text. 
 
24.  For both measures, the simple correlation between the ORPS-based measure and our 
preferred Census measure is over 0.9.  
 
25.  This view is supported by evidence that renters are less likely to vote (see DiPasquale and 
Glaeser, 1999). 
 
26.  Our fixed effects account for any time-invariant impact of a renter majority on the 
demand for school performance, but they do not account for variation in this impact over 
time. 
 
27.  To be specific, we used simple, preliminary regressions to find measures that were 
significantly related to median income, tax price, and state aid. 
 
28.  We do not have a consistent measure of the graduation rate, so we use one minus “the 
rate of dropouts, which refers to any student, regardless of age, who left school prior to 
graduation for any reason except death and did not enter another school or high school 
equivalency preparation program or other diploma program” (New York State 
Department of Education, 2003). We do not use high-school test score measures because 
high schools have considerable leeway during this period in determining whether to 
emphasize, in each subject, State Regents examinations or the easier Regents competency 
tests as graduation requirements. 
 
29.  Regressions with a separate transportation/building aid variable and/or with distinctions 
among various types of standard operating aid are available from the authors. These 
alternative specifications do not alter any of our substantive conclusions about the 
impacts of STAR. Moreover, the transportation/building aid variable always has a 
significant impact on operating spending or on student performance and we generally 
cannot reject the hypothesis that this aid has the same coefficient as operating aid. 
 
30.  We conducted three types of tests for the instruments in the cost model (and the demand 
model, which is discussed below). First, we regressed each endogenous variable against 
various combinations of the instruments to identify groups of instruments that have a 
significant impact—the first requirement for a good instrument. We rejected any potential 
instrument that was not significant at the 10 percent level for at least one endogenous 
variable. Second, we checked the correlation between each instrument that passed the 
first test and the dependent variable by including each instrument, one at a time, in a 
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preliminary 2SLS version of the cost model (using all the other instruments). We kept 
only those potential instruments that are not significant in the cost model (as indicated by 
a t-statistic below 1.0), which is the second requirement for a good instrument. Third, we 
conducted an over-identification test (Wooldridge, 2003) on the remaining instruments to 
determine if they instruments are indeed exogenous. The final set of instruments for the 
cost/efficiency models includes the average per pupil property value and 4th and 8th grade 
test performance of adjacent school districts, the minimum percent of limited English 
students in adjacent school districts, and the county average salary. The selected 
instruments are all significant in the first-stage regression at the 1 percent level and not 
significant in the second-stage regression at the 10 percent significance level. The first-
stage high t-statistics mitigate concerns about weak instruments (Bound, Jaeger, and 
Baker, 1995). 
 
31.  Recall from equation (19) that the sign of the efficiency elasticity for variable X is the 
opposite of the sign of X’s estimated coefficient. 
 
32.  Our approach is to model the tax exemption for which voters are eligible, not the 
exemptions voters actually claim. Because not all voters apply for their STAR 
exemptions, these two approaches might not lead to the same answer. However, STAR 
has been widely publicized, and we see no reason to think that the median voter does not 
know about and apply for a STAR exemption. Rockoff (2003) provides some evidence 
that is consistent with this position:  STAR’s estimated impact on spending is about the 
same whether STAR exemptions are defined by entitlement or by a rough estimate of 
actual claims (with entitlement as an instrument). 
 
33.  This result might indicate that when private schools are available, the most active parents 
send their children to them, thereby lowering monitoring, and hence efficiency, in public 
schools. Another possibility is that private school attendance is endogenous because more 
children move to private schools when a district is inefficient. We have not been able to 
identify an instrument for testing the second hypothesis, so this result does not have a 
clear interpretation.  
 
34.  The Hausman tests support fixed effects over random effects. As in the cost equation, 
instruments are drawn from neighboring districts using the rules in note 29. The final set 
of instruments consists of the average efficiency index and unemployment rates of 
adjacent school districts (again with high t-statistics in the first stage).  
 
35.  We do not find this result compelling, however, because Rockoff also omits the tax-share 
term, /V V , which plays a central role in demand theory and which is obviously 
correlated with the share of non-residential property. 
 
36.  Rockoff faces similar data limitations but goes to enormous effort to estimate elderly and 
non-elderly house values using the 2000 5-percent Census IPUMS data and other sources.  
 
37.  New York’s requirements for a high-school diploma shifted to more rigorous tests in 
English, mathematics, social studies, and global history between 1996-97 and 1998-99. 
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The only shift to a more rigorous test during our sample period was the one in science in 
1999-2000. See New York State Education Department (2003). 
 
38.  We calculate the impact of STAR using equations (2), (5), and (6)-(8), with separate 
coefficients for each tax-price term and with separate flypaper effects for the efficiency 
and demand equations. These equations are used to derive the percentage changes in S, C, 
e, E, and t when the STAR matching rate goes from zero to X/V. These equations are then 
combined with our estimates of the parameters and data from school districts in the state 
to obtain the results in Table 8. A technical appendix containing these equations is 
available from the authors. 
 
39.  Our equations for the full-capitalization case are available in a technical appendix. 
STAR-induced increases in S also might be capitalized into house values, and higher-
property values reduce e (see Tables 4 and 5) and thereby raise E and t, all else equal. 
These two effects are not included in our full-capitalization calculations both because 
they are small in magnitude and because, roughly speaking, they offset each other. The 
literature on tax and service capitalization is reviewed in Ross and Yinger (1999). 
 
40.  Our simulations ignore the hard-to-interpret result in Tables 6 and 7 that majority-renter 
districts are actually somewhat more responsive to STAR; the STAR-induced disparities 
would be even greater with out this assumption. 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
Table 1.  STAR Savings and School District Outcomes 
 
Region STAR STAR 
 Savingsa Exemptionsb 
  (per pupil) (% of value) 
New York City    $320   3.61% 
Yonkers $1,289 15.91% 
Downstate Small Cities $1,290   7.64% 
Downstate Suburbs $1,395   9.54% 
Upstate Big Three    $564 15.11% 
Upstate Small Cities    $916 13.06% 
Upstate Suburbs $1,048 14.82% 
Upstate Rural    $816 13.48% 
Average District  $1,055 12.91% 
a2001-2002 property tax reduction per pupil due to STAR exemptions.  
bFor 2001-2002; includes both enhanced and basic STAR exemptions;  as a percentage of 
 total property value. 
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Table 2.  Features of STAR and School District Outcomes 
 
Region STAR Tax-Price Component Tax Share Pre-STAR:  1998-99 Post-STAR:  2001-2002 
 Basic With Renter
Adjustment 
 Effective 
Tax Ratea 
Spending 
Per Pupil 
($2002) 
Performance 
Indexb 
Effective
Tax Rate 
Alternative 
Effective 
Tax Ratec  
Spending 
Per Pupil 
 
Performance 
Indexb 
New York City 79.81% 100.00% 63.03% 1.09% $9,599 56.5 1.08% 1.28% $11,284 57.5 
Yonkers 70.00% 100.00% 56.04% 0.88% $12,783 54.3 1.07% 1.15% $14,206 59.5 
Downstate Small Cities 76.65% 90.97% 43.10% 1.40% $13,878 68.2 1.60% 1.61% $14,682 76.0 
Downstate Suburbs 81.76% 82.24% 38.09% 1.76% $14,095 77.2 1.37% 2.03% $14,977 82.6 
Upstate Big Three 51.36% 100.00% 46.48% 1.47% $10,308 52.1 1.89% 1.69% $11,557 52.1 
Upstate Small Cities 59.41% 68.86% 37.22% 1.51% $9,686 65.8 1.75% 1.82% $11,392 68.4 
Upstate Suburbs 67.29% 67.82% 36.96% 1.57% $9,334 72.6 1.80% 1.82% $10,199 75.6 
Upstate Rural 57.85% 57.85% 30.85% 1.40% $9,702 69.3 1.71% 1.80% $10,998 72.4 
Average District 67.51% 68.92% 36.00% 1.56% $10,664 72.0 1.66% 1.86% $11,756 75.5 
a This rate equals (operating spending minus operating aid)/(total property value). 
b This is an equal-weight index of 4th grade test scores, 8th grade test scores, and the non-dropout rate. 
c This rate equals (2002 operating spending minus 2002 operating aid)/(1999 total property value inflated to 2002 dollars) 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics, 2528 New York School Districts, 1999-2002 
 
Variable Mean
Std. 
 Dev. Min      Max
   
Log of per pupil operating expenditure a 9.207 0.248 8.361 10.770
Log of outcome Index (equal weights for 3 measures) 4.295 0.119 3.761 4.579
Log of outcome index (alternative weights for 3 measures)b 4.193 0.161 3.415 4.569
Log of teacher salarya,c 10.363 0.354 5.899 10.825
Log of enrollment 7.459 0.968 4.575 13.872
Percent of students with limited English proficiency (LEP) 1.328 3.151 0.000 27.128
Percent of children receiving free lunch 21.812 15.471 0.000 90.842
Percent of high-cost students 1.075 0.846 0.000 5.501
Percent of children with female household head 13.601 5.166 5.049 43.140
     
Log of median family incomea 10.728 0.358 9.594 12.403
Per pupil property valuea 480,387 1,189,393 61,053 24,500,000
Log of general tax share -1.025 0.486 -3.488 2.148
Log of STAR tax price -0.197 0.196 -1.396 -0.00016
Ratio of operating aid to median income  0.018 0.016 0.000 0.300
Ratio of matching aid to median income 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.079
Percent of adults with college educationd 0.098 8.091 -28.975 33.540
Percent of renter occupied housing units 24.414 10.948 4.667 69.813
Percent of private school enrollment 6.494 8.856 0.000 59.806
a Adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index. 
bWeight is 25% for 4th-grade scores and non-dropout rate and 50% for 8th-grade scores. 
cPredicted salary of teachers with experience less than 5 years.     
dResiduals from a regression of education level on median income.     
Sources: New York State Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, New York State 
Comptroller’s Office, New York State Office of Real Property Tax Service, U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Table 4.  Cost/Efficiency Model with District Fixed Effects 
 
Variable Basic Test of Test of Model  Basic 
 Model STAR's  Renters' with Year Model with
  Aid Impact Role Fixed Effects Alternative
     Weightsa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cost Variables      
Log of outcome index 0.871 0.85 0.87 0.246 0.605 
 [4.76]** [4.76]** [4.70]** [1.34] [4.27]**
Log of teacher salary 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.006 
 [1.90] [1.88] [1.90] [2.40]* [1.32] 
Log of enrollment -1.138 -1.18 -1.146 -1.199 -1.201 
 [4.15]** [4.37]** [4.14]** [6.67]** [4.46]**
Square of log enrollment 0.024 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.029 
 [1.24]** [1.42]** [1.26]** [1.97]** [1.54]**
Percent of students with limited Eng 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.31] [0.30] [0.29] [0.79] [0.81] 
Percent of children receiving free lunch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 [1.48] [1.49] [1.34] [2.08]* [0.49] 
Percent high cost students 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 [0.86] [0.94] [0.86] [0.95] [0.71] 
Percent female headed households - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
Efficiency Variables      
Log of median Income 0.019 0.017 0.02 0.04 0.025 
 [1.14] [1.04] [1.15] [3.60]** [1.49] 
Per pupil property value 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 [5.29]** [5.41]** [5.28]** [2.50]* [4.86]**
Log of tax share -0.047 -0.041 -0.048 -0.019 -0.049 
 [4.06]** [3.60]** [4.03]** [2.60]** [4.31]**
Log of STAR tax price -0.088 -0.102 -0.088 0.018 -0.099 
 [6.12]** [6.02]** [6.10]** [1.64] [7.33]**
Percent of adults with college education -0.159 -0.163 -0.161 -0.458 -0.106 
 [0.77]** [0.79] [0.78] [3.71]** [0.51] 
Percent of renter occupied houses - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
Percent of private school enrollment 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0 0.001 
 [1.08] [1.01] [1.08] [0.10] [0.90] 
Total state aid variable 0.393  0.401 0.18 0.382 
 [3.08]**  [3.11]** [2.15]* [3.01]**
         Total aid, part I  0.321    
  [3.01]**    
         Total aid, part II  -0.704    
  [2.83]**    
Renter Interaction for STAR tax price   0.023   
   [0.71]   
Constant 12.159 12.425 12.195 15.118 13.511 
 [8.52]** [8.87]** [8.41]** [12.83]** [10.56]**
Observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Number of School Districts 628 628 628 628 628 
Notes:  Operating spending (less transportation) per pupil is the dependent variable; estimated  
             with two-stage least squares (the outcome index and teacher salaries are endogenous);  
             estimated with district fixed effects.  As discussed in the text, instruments are values of   
             related variables for neighboring districts.  Data cover 1998-99 through 2001-2002.  
a Weights equal 25% for 4th grade scores and the non-dropout rate and 50% for 8th grade scores. 
"Numbers in brackets are t-statistics; a * (**) indicates significance at the two-tailed 5 (1) percent 
 significance level." 
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Table 5.  Cost/Efficiency Model with District Random Effects 
 
Variable Basic Test of Test of Model Basic 
 Model STAR's Renters' with Year Model with 
  Aid Impact Role Fixed Effects Alternative 
     Weightsa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cost Variables      
Log of outcome index 0.368 0.365 0.367 0.094 0.319 
 [3.27]** [3.24]** [3.21]** [0.47] [3.50]**
Log of teacher salary 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.017 
 [4.93]** [4.88]** [4.91]** [3.65]** [4.21]**
Log of enrollment -0.562 -0.572 -0.566 -0.872 -0.606 
 [10.23]** [10.32]** [10.24]** [12.73]** [10.24]**
Square of log enrollment 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.046 0.032 
 [8.40]** [8.46]** [8.39]** [10.07]** [8.40]**
Percent of students with limited Eng.  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 [2.24]* [2.20]* [2.19]* [1.66] [2.19]* 
Percent of children receiving free lunch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 [1.01] [0.99] [0.80] [0.17] [0.47] 
Percent high cost students 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 [0.22] [0.22] [0.22] [0.10] [0.14] 
Percent female headed households 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.011 
 [3.67]** [3.68]** [3.63]** [2.71]** [3.76]**
Efficiency Variables      
Log of median Income 0.251 0.247 0.251 0.235 0.246 
 [20.47]** [20.42]** [20.38]** [20.28]** [19.90]**
Per pupil property value 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 [11.65]** [11.55]** [11.54]** [6.43]** [10.70]**
Log of tax share -0.071 -0.068 -0.072 -0.049 -0.068 
 [7.96]** [7.61]** [7.85]** [6.02]** [7.41]**
Log of STAR tax price -0.158 -0.159 -0.158 -0.096 -0.156 
 [12.82]** [10.80]** [12.76]** [7.91]** [12.91]**
Percent of adults with college education -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 [2.89]** [2.88]** [2.88]** [0.38] [2.80]**
Percent of renter occupied houses 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 [3.03]** [2.95]** [2.97]** [1.92] [2.75]**
Percent of private school enrollment 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 [4.89]** [4.81]** [4.87]** [2.85]** [4.51]**
Total state aid variable 0.422  0.431 0.207 0.399 
 [4.12]**  [4.17]** [2.22]* [3.80]**
         Total aid, part I  0.33   
  [3.75]**   
         Total aid, part II  -0.497   
  [2.37]*   
Renter Interaction for STAR tax price   0.029  
   [1.09]  
Constant 6.823 6.943 6.857 9.726 7.349 
 [14.49]** [14.70]** [14.42]** [11.04]** [18.66]**
Observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Number of School Districts 628 628   628 628 628 
Notes:  Operating spending (less transportation) per pupil is the dependent variable; estimated with two-stage least squares 
            (the outcome index and teacher salaries are endogenous); estimated with district random effects.  As discussed in 
            the text, instruments are values of related variables for neighboring districts.   Data cover 1998-99 through 2001-2002.        
a Weights equal 25% for 4th grade scores and the non-dropout rate and 50% for 8th grade scores. 
"Numbers in brackets are t-statistics; a * (**) indicates significance at the two-tailed 5 (1) percent significance level." 
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Table 6.  Demand Model (Based on Fixed-Effects Cost/Efficiency Model)a 
 
Variable Basic Test of Test of Model  Basic Model  
 Model STAR's  Renters' with Year Model with without 
  Aid Impact Role Fixed Effects Alternative Efficiency
     Weights  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of Median Family Incomed 0.047 0.028 0.047 0.059 0.053 0.025 
 [5.06]** [3.24]** [5.04]** [1.76] [3.58]** [1.71] 
Log of Cost Index 0.25 0.245 0.238 -0.004 0.634 -0.131 
 [3.85]** [3.93]** [3.67]** [0.10] [6.17]** [4.51]**
Log of Predicted Efficiencyf 0.547 0.54 0.522 1.65 1.063  
 [6.07]** [6.28]** [5.83]** [1.84] [7.61]**  
Log of Tax Sharee -0.076 -0.068 -0.077 -0.044 -0.114 -0.046 
 [10.87]** [10.86]** [11.09]** [1.92] [10.81]** [5.40]**
Log of STAR Tax Pricee -0.158 -0.185 -0.152 0.054 -0.242 -0.089 
 [13.35]** [11.65]** [12.89]** [1.56] [13.30]** [14.08]**
Total state aid variable 0.474  0.493 0.37 0.725 0.26 
 [6.48]**  [6.77]** [1.67] [6.37]** [2.35]* 
         Total aid, part I  0.436     
  [7.26]**     
         Total aid, part II  -1.183     
  [6.54]**     
Renter Interaction for STAR tax price   0.074    
   [4.92]**    
       
Constant 0.623 0.887 0.768 -0.489 -3.102 4.498 
 [0.97] [1.48] [1.20] [0.19] [3.09]** [28.35]**
       
Observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Number of school districts 628 628 628 628 628 628 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of an equal-weight index of 4th and 8th grade scores and the non-dropout rate; the cost and efficiency 
             variables are based on the regression in column (1) of Table 4; estimated with two-stage least squares (the efficiency variable is endogenous); 
             estimated with district fixed effects.  As discussed in the text, instruments are values of related variables for neighboring districts.  
             Data cover 1998-99 through 2001-2002. 
a Weights equal 25% for 4th grade scores and the non-dropout rate and 50% for 8th grade scores. 
"Numbers in brackets are t-statistics; a * (**) indicates significance at the two-tailed 5 (1) percent 
  significance level."  
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Table 7.  Demand Model (Based on Random-Effects Cost/Efficiency Model) 
Variable Basic Test of Test of Model  Basic Model  
 Model STAR's  Renters' with Year Model with without 
  Aid Impact Role Fixed Effects Alternative  Efficiency 
     Weights  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log of median family income 0.137 0.109 0.134 0.328 0.236 0.001 
 [5.04]** [4.77]** [4.99]** [2.30]* [4.99]** [0.09] 
Log of Cost Index -0.14 -0.147 -0.132 -0.008 -0.821 -0.146 
 [1.67] [1.83] [1.60] [0.08] [3.54]** [1.14] 
Log of Predicted Efficiency 0.648 0.616 0.63 1.813 1.175  
 [5.30]** [5.50]** [5.19]** [2.31]* [5.54]**  
Log of tax share -0.094 -0.085 -0.095 -0.151 -0.15 -0.041 
 [8.20]** [8.40]** [8.44]** [2.34]* [7.62]** [4.84]** 
Log of STAR tax price -0.187 -0.212 -0.182 -0.199 -0.281 -0.081 
 [9.17]** [8.84]** [8.94]** [2.17]* [8.64]** [12.94]** 
Total state aid variable 0.508  0.524 0.744 0.754 0.24 
 [5.74]**  [6.06]** [2.11]* [5.07]** [2.15]* 
         Total aid part I  0.485     
  [6.38]**     
         Total aid part II  -1.274     
  [5.88]**     
Renter Interaction for STAR tax price   0.059    
   [3.33]**    
       
Constant 0.919 1.371 0.977 -6.289 0.837 4.886 
 [1.09] [1.81] [1.18] [1.39] [0.88] [8.34]** 
       
Observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Number of school districts 628 628 628 628 628 628 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of an equal-weight index of 4th and 8th grade scores and the   
             non-dropout rate; the cost and efficiency variables are based on the regression in column (1) of Table 5;  
             estimated with two-stage least squares (the efficiency variable is endogenous);   
             estimated with district fixed effects.  As discussed in the text, instruments are values of    
             related variables for neighboring districts.   Data cover 1998-99 through 2001-2002.   
a Weights equal 25% for 4th grade scores and the non-dropout rate and 50% for 8th grade scores.  
"Numbers in brackets are t-statistics; a * (**) indicates significance at the two-tailed 5 (1) percent 
  significance level."  
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Table 8. Simulated Impacts of STAR on School Districts in New York State 
 
                                            Estimated Percentage Impact of STAR on 
Region 
 
Student 
Performance 
Index 
(1) 
Total 
Education 
Costs 
(2) 
School 
District 
Efficiency 
(3) 
School  
Spending 
Per Pupil 
(4) 
School 
Property 
Tax Rate 
(5) 
Offset of 
STAR 
Savings 
(6) 
Tax Rate 
with Full 
Capitalizationa 
(7) 
Panel A:  Based on Tables 4 and 6 
New York City 2.14% 1.85% -1.88% 3.80% 6.60% 23.48% 8.15% 
Yonkers 3.40% 2.94% -2.98% 6.10% 15.44% 31.52% 16.05% 
Downstate Small Cities 2.96% 2.56% -2.56% 5.29% 9.29% 21.02% 6.31% 
Downstate Suburbs 2.24% 1.94% -1.94% 3.96% 5.55% 20.05% 1.81% 
Upstate Big Three 5.49% 4.74% -4.77% 9.99% 33.87% 36.54% 37.64% 
Upstate Small Cities 4.96% 4.28% -4.20% 8.90% 24.61% 29.15% 21.87% 
Upstate Suburbs 3.90% 3.37% -3.32% 6.94% 15.54% 26.41% 9.81% 
Upstate Rural 5.53% 4.77% -4.64% 9.93% 29.60% 30.88% 42.21% 
Average District 4.06% 3.51% -3.45% 7.26% 18.04% 26.42% 18.60% 
Panel B:  Based on Tables 5 and 7 
New York City 2.34% 0.74% -3.25% 4.13% 6.97% 24.82% 9.08% 
Yonkers 3.73% 1.18% -4.99% 6.49% 15.08% 30.80% 17.45% 
Downstate Small Cities 3.24% 1.02% -4.51% 5.85% 9.60% 16.09% 7.67% 
Downstate Suburbs 2.45% 0.77% -3.56% 4.51% 6.09% 22.19% 2.85% 
Upstate Big Three 6.04% 1.89% -7.58% 10.25% 28.36% 30.78% 39.04% 
Upstate Small Cities 5.44% 1.70% -7.36% 9.86% 21.87% 27.93% 25.73% 
Upstate Suburbs 4.27% 1.34% -5.96% 7.81% 15.33% 27.02% 12.40% 
Upstate Rural 6.06% 1.90% -8.19% 11.10% 41.15% 50.70% 47.87% 
Average District  4.45% 1.40% -6.14% 8.14% 21.33% 32.96% 21.81% 
Notes:  These simulations are based on the estimated coefficients in Tables 4 through 7 and on the formulas in the text, adjusted to allow for different 
flypaper effects in the cost/efficiency and demand regressions and to allow for different price elasticities for the different tax-price components. 
 
a This column assumes that the STAR exemptions and STAR-induced property tax rate increases are fully capitalized into house values and (for the rate 
increase only) into the value of commercial and industrial property. 
 
 
 
44 
 
References 
Addonizio, Michael. 1990. “School Aid and Property Tax Relief: Some Evidence of Conflicting 
Incentives.” Journal of Education Finance 16: 37-48. 
 
Addonizio, Michael. 1991. Intergovernmental Grants and the Demand for Local Education 
Expenditures, Public Finance Quarterly 19 (2, April):  209-232. 
 
Andrews, M., William D. Duncombe, and John Yinger. 2002. “Revisiting Economies of Size in 
Education:  Are We Any Closer to a Consensus?”  Economics of Education Review 21 
(3):  245-262. 
 
Bound, John, David A. Jaeger, and Regina Baker. 1995. “Problems with Instrumental Variables 
Estimation When the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables Is Weak.” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 90 (June): 443-450. 
 
Bradford, David F., R. A. Malt, and Wallace E. Oates. 1969. “The Rising Cost of Local Public 
Services: Some Evidence and Reflections.” National Tax Journal, 22 (2,
June): 185-202. 
 
Bradford, David F., and Wallace E. Oates. 1971a. “The Analysis of Revenue-Sharing in a New 
Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
85: 416-439. 
 
Bradford, David F., and Wallace E. Oates. 1971b. “Towards a Predictive Theory of 
Intergovernmental Grants.” American Economic Review 61 (2): 440-448. 
 
Charnes, A. W., W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes. 1978. “Measuring the Efficiency of Decision 
Making Units.” European Journal of Operational Research 2: 429-444. 
 
DiPasquale, Denise, and Edward L. Glaeser. 1999. “Incentives and Social Capital:  Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens?” Journal of Urban Economics, 45: 354-384. 
 
Downs, Thomas, and Thomas Pogue. 1994. “Adjusting School Aid Formula for the Higher Cost 
of Educating Disadvantage Students.” National Tax Journal 47: 89-110. 
 
Duncombe, William D. 1996. “Public Expenditure Research: What Have We Learned?” 
Public Budgeting & Finance, 16 (2, Summer): 26-58. 
 
Duncombe, William D., John Ruggiero, and John Yinger. 1996. “Alternative Approaches to 
Measuring the Cost of Education.” In Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-Based 
Reform in Education, edited by H.F. Ladd (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution): 
327-356. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Duncombe, William D., and John Yinger. 1993. “An Analysis of Returns to Scale in Public 
Production, With an Application to Fire Protection.” Journal of Public Economics 52 
(August): 49-72. 
 
Duncombe, William D., and John Yinger. 1997. “Why Is It So Hard to Help Central City 
Schools?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16 (Winter): 85-113. 
 
Duncombe, William D., and John Yinger. 1998a. “An Analysis of Two Educational Policies in 
New York State: Performance Standards and Property Tax Relief.” In Educational 
Finance to Support Higher Learning Standards, edited by J. H. Wyckoff (Albany:  New 
York State Board of Regents): 98-137. 
 
Duncombe, William D., and John Yinger. 1998b. “School Finance Reform: Aid Formulas and
 Equity Objectives.” National Tax Journal 51 (June): 239-262. 
 
Duncombe, William D., and John Yinger. 2000. “Financing Higher Student Performance 
Standard: the Case of New York State.” Economics of Education Review 19 (October): 
363-386. 
 
Duncombe, William D., and John Yinger. 2001. “Alternative Paths to Property Tax Relief.” In: 
Property Taxation and Local Government Finance, edited by W. E. Oates (Cambridge,
 MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy): 243-294. 
 
Duncombe, William D., Jerry Miner, and John Ruggiero. 1997. “Empirical Evaluation of 
Bureaucratic Models of Inefficiency.” Public Choice 93: 1-18. 
 
Eom, Tae Ho. 2004. “Evaluation of New York State Property Tax Policy: Administration and 
Behavioral Impacts of the School Property Tax Relief (STAR) Program.” Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Public Administration Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, 
NY. 
 
Fare, R., and C.A. Lovell. 1978. “Measuring the Technical Efficiency of Production.” Journal of  
Economic Theory 19: 150-62. 
 
Farrell, M. J. 1957. “The Measurement of Productivity Efficiency.” Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A, General, Vol. 253: 253-281. 
 
Fisher, Ronald C. 1988. “Intergovernmental Incentives and Local Fiscal Behavior.” Working 
Paper, Michigan State University. 
 
Fisher, Ronald C., and Leslie E. Papke. 2000. “Local Government Response to Education 
Grants.” National Tax Journal 53 (March): 153-168. 
 
Hines, James R., Jr., and Richard H. Thaler. 1995. “Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, The
 Journal of Economic Perspectives.” 9 (4, Fall): 217-226. 
 
 
 
46 
 
  
Hoxby, Caroline M. 2001. “Rising Tide: New Evidence on Competition and the Public Schools.”  
Education Next, 1 (4, Winter): 69-74. 
 
Hoxby, Caroline M. 2000. “Do Private Schools Provide Competition For Public Schools?” 
NBER Working Paper No. 4978, Updated Version. Cambridge, MA:  National Bureau of  
Economic Research. 
 
Inman, Robert P. 1978. “Testing Political Economy’s ‘As If’ Proposition: Is the Median Voter 
Really Decisive?” Public Choice 33 (Winter): 45-65. 
 
Ladd, Helen F., and John Yinger. 1991. America’s Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health and the Design of 
Urban Policy. Updated Edition. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press. 
 
McCarty, Therese A., and Suthathip Yaisawarng. 1993. “Technical Efficiency in New Jersey 
School Districts.” In The Measurement of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and 
Applications, Fried, H., Lovell, C. and Schmidt, S. (Eds.), (New York: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
New York State Education Department. 2003. Understanding Your School Report Card 2003:
 Guide to Secondary School Assessments. 
http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/repcrd2003/information/secondary/guide.html.  
 
New York State Office of Real Property Services. 2004. STAR Assessor’s Guide:  School Tax 
Relief (STAR) Exemption. http://www.orps.state.ny.us/star/2004_guide.htm. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Ray, Subhash C. 1991. “Resource Use in Public Schools:  A Study in Connecticut.” Management  
Science 37: 1520-1628. 
 
Reschovsky, Andrew, and Jennifer Imazeki. 1998. “The Development of School Finance 
Formulas to Guarantee the Provision of Adequate Education to Low-Income Students.” 
In Developments in School Finance, 1997: Does Money Matter? Fowler, W. J., Jr. (Ed.), 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Educational 
Statistics): 121-148. 
 
Reschovsky, Andrew, and Jennifer Imazeki. 2001. “Achieving Educational Adequacy Through 
School Finance Reform.” Journal of Education Finance 26 (4, Spring): 373-396. 
 
Reschovsky, Andrew, and Jennifer Imazeki. 2003. “Let No Child Be Left Behind: Determining 
the Cost of Improving Student Performance.” Public Finance Review 31 (May): 263-290. 
 
Rockoff, Jonah E. 2003. “Community Heterogeneity and Local Response to Fiscal Incentives.”  
Working paper, Harvard University. 
 
Roemer, John E., and Joaquim Silvestre. 2002. “The ‘Flypaper Effect’ Is Not an 
Anomaly.”Journal of Public Economic Theory 4 (1, January): 1-17. 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Ross, Stephen, and John Yinger. 1999. “Sorting and Voting:  A Review of the Literature on 
Urban Public Finance.” In Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, Volume 3, 
Applied Urban Economics, Cheshire, P. and Mills, E.S. (Eds.), (Amsterdam: North-
Holland): 2001-2060. 
 
Rubinfeld, Daniel L. 1987. “Local Public Economics: A Methodological Review.” In Handbook 
of Public Economics, vol. 2, edited by Auerbach, A. J. and Feldstein, M., (eds.), 
(Amsterdam:  North-Holland): 87-161. 
 
Ruggiero, John. 1996. “Efficiency of Educational Production:  An Analysis of New York School 
Districts.” Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (3, August): 499-509. 
 
Ruggiero, John, William D. Duncombe, and Jerry Miner. 1995. “On the Measuring and Causes 
of Technical Inefficiency in Local Public Services: With an Application to Public 
Education.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5(4): 402-428. 
 
Seiford, Lawrence M., and Robert M. Thrall. 1990. “Recent Development in DEA: The 
Mathematical Programming Approach to Frontier Analysis.” Journal of Econometrics 
Vol. 46: 7-38. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. South-Western, 
Independence: Mason, Ohio Thomson Learning, 2nd Edition. 
 
